Judicial Interpretation and the Third Pillar: Ireland’s Acceptance of the European Arrest Warrant and the Gözütok and Brügge Case
This article discusses the potential effects of a declaration by Ireland on its acceptance of the European Arrest Warrant (stating Ireland's opposition to investigative detention) on the interpretation of the Framework Decision and of Ireland's implementing legislation, in the broader context of judicial interpretation of EU Third Pillar measures. It is argued that what is essentially the public international law nature of the Third Pillar may justify reliance on the declaration in any interpretation of Ireland's implementing legislation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (assuming its jurisdiction), which would contrast with the lack of weight traditionally accorded such declarations in EC law. This interpretive reliance on the declaration is, it is suggested, consistent with a more restrained approach to adjudication in Third Pillar matters than that which has often characterised the interpretive methodology of the ECJ in the First Pillar. Assuming that weight is given to Ireland's declaration by the Irish courts in the interpretation of the Irish implementing legislation, it seems likely that there will be implications in particular for those other parties to the Framework Decision from the civil law tradition, where there is no clear dividing line between the investigative and trial phases of a case. The interpretive issues relating to the declaration are examined in light of domestic Irish law and of EC/EU and international law - three legal systems of which the Framework Decision is a part. It is sought to place the issue in the broader context of the proper scope of the interpretive power of the ECJ as a constitutional court, especially in the context of the debate as to the Constitution for Europe and mirroring the debate in the US as to the interpretation of its Constitution and Bill of Rights by US courts. Finally, the recent decision of the ECJ in Gýzýtok and Brýgge,17 the first decision of the ECJ on a Third Pillar issue, is examined, and it is argued that the same concern with judicial restraint in constitutional interpretation may have justified a different legal analysis to that preferred by the ECJ and a different result in the case.
Journal/Publisher: European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice, 13(2)
Publication type: Article
Number of pages/Page range: 255 - 283
Language/s (content): English
Date of publication: 01-03-05
Personal data
Full name Gerard CONWAY
Current occupation Contact Point
University/Institution Brunel University London
Address Uxbridge
Postal code UB8 3PH
Telephone 0044(0)1895267492