LU

On 6 October 2021, the First Chamber of the Court rendered a judgement in the context of mutual recognition of pecuniary sanctions. In this case, LU was fined 80 euros for traffic infraction in Austria. The administrative body in Weiz (Austria) transmitted the decision to the District tribunal of Zalaegerszeg in Hungary in order to execute the sanction as framed by Article 5 of the Framework decision 2005/214. Nevertheless, the district tribunal in Hungary had doubts about whether such an infraction fell within the scope of Article 5 paragraph 1, thirty third passage of the framework decision (offences for which the verification of the double criminality is not necessary). In this context, the district tribunal filed a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in order to ask whether Article 5 paragraphe 1 of Framework Decision 2005/214 should be interpreted as not giving any margin of appreciation to the executing State to deny the execution of the decision, when the issuing State has qualified the conduct under this provision; and if the first question is answered in the negative, whether the executing State can consider that the issuing State has erred in its assessment about the qualification of the offence referred to in Article 5.

Concerning the admissibility matter, the Austrian government claimed that the request for a preliminary ruling was inadmissible as it was not clear whether this would be relevant for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings. The Court recalls that questions submitted in relation to the interpretation of EU Law are presumed to be relevant. Thus, in the present case since the interpretation of EU Law is at stake, the Court should answer the questions raised by the referring court.

The Court of Justice assessed jointly the two questions. It started its assessment by recalling that the Framework decision 2005/214 hinges upon the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition. Against this backdrop, the competent authority of the executing State should, in principle, recognise and execute the decision and cannot refuse to do so unless it invokes one of the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution referred to in the Framework Decision itself.

Furthermore, as regards the offences for which the verification of the double criminality is not needed, the CJEU undelines that the executing State is bound by the legal qualification given to the facts by the issuing State. Therefore, the executing State cannot deny, in principle, the execution of the decision requiring a financial penalty due to a different assessment in the qualification of the facts, otherwise this would be contrary to the principle of mutual recognition. Nevertheless, calling upon Article 20(3) of the Framework Decision the Court recalls that the executing State may oppose the recognition and the execution of decisions – apart for the grounds laid down in Article 7 – where the certificate referred to in Article 4 gives rise to an issue that fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU may have been infringed.